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should	 reform	 the	 staff	 rules,	 so	 that	 EU	 civil	
servants	 responsible	 for	 grants	 allocation	 are	
not	 forced	 to	 choose	 between	 the	 competing	
goals	 of	 budget	 transparency	 and	 flexibility,	




should	 work	 closely	 with	 the	 European	
Parliament,	 particularly	 with	 its	 democracy	
caucus,	 to	ensure	that	 the	Parliament	conducts	
a	mid-term	evaluation	of	 the	effectiveness	and	
utility	 of	 the	 new	 EIDHR,	 with	 a	 focus	 on	 a	
qualitative	rather	that	purely	financial	evaluation,	





at	 risk	 and	where	 the	 effectiveness	 and	 utility	
of	the	EU	instrument	can	prove	problematic,	for	
instance	in	Cuba	or	Belarus.
•	The	 Czech	 and	 Swedish	 EU	 presidencies	
should	 set	 as	 a	 priority	 the	 completion	 of	
the	 above	 monitoring	 process,	 and	 also	
the	 development	 and	 implementation	 of	




and	 strengthening	 the	 democracy	 assistance	
focus	on	Ukraine,	Moldova,	Georgia,	Armenia	
and	Azerbaijan.




Is the EU ready to put democracy assistance 
at the heart of European foreign policy?
The EU can take credit for preparing central European countries for integration, but it 
continues to be hesitant to invest in democracy and human rights under authoritarian 
rule and at critical stages of transition. A values-based approach to human rights must 
be combined with flexibility and strong support to civil society at all stages of the 
democratisation process.
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•	Visegrad	 governments	 should	 support	
flexible	 funding	 initiatives,	 including	 the	
European	 Foundation	 for	 Democracy	 through	
Partnership	 (EFDP),	 and	 opt	 for	 more	 flexible,	
less	bureaucratic	and	more	hands-on	European-
level	approaches	to	democracy	assistance;	the	
Visegrad	 governments	 should	 then	 engage	 in	
coalition-building	 among	 EU	 member	 states,	
EU	 institutions,	 and	 other	 key	 stakeholders	
(including	 political	 foundations)	 to	 ensure	 EU	
funding	 reaches	 civil	 society	 groups	 working	






a	 pillar	 of	 a	 common	 EU	 foreign	 policy,	 and	
for	 this	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	 the	 priorities	 of	 the	
new	 EU	High	 Representative	 for	 Foreign	 and	
Security	Policy	and	the	new	EU	External	Action	
Service.	
•	The	 idea	 that	 the	 EU	 should	 provide	
development	 assistance	 only	 to	 governments	
that	demonstrate	political	will	and	a	measurable	
commitment	 in	 the	 field	 of	 democracy	 and	
human	rights	should	be	adopted	and	consistently	
implemented	 within	 the	 new	 external	 action	
agenda.	The	‘poverty	reduction	first’	approach	
is	based	on	a	fallacious	concept	that	significant	
and	 sustainable	 progress	 in	 poverty	 reduction	
can	be	achieved	without	improvements	in	good	
governance	and	accountability.
•	Non-governmental	 organisations	 from	 the	
EU’s	 new	 member	 states	 should	 be	 given	
greater	 visibility	 in	 Brussels,	 and	 groups	 with	
recent	transition	experience,	but	limited	financial	
capacity,	 should	 be	 encouraged	 to	 apply	 for	
EU	 funding	 under	 the	 European	 Instrument	 for	
Democracy	and	Human	Rights.	V4	governments	
should	assist	 their	NGOs	 to	participate	 in	EU	
democracy	 projects	 through	 the	 provision	 of	
matching	 funds	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 their	
own	democracy	assistance	programmes.
Development policy and 
select “strategic” relations 
versus democracy and 
human rights
The	enlargement	of	the	European	Union	to	27	





increasingly	 squeezed	 between	 Russia	 and	
the	 west,	 as	 was	 so	 evident	 when	 many	 EU	






new	 members	 who	 joined	 the	 EU	 in	 2004.	
But	the	EU	waited	until	 the	fall	of	authoritarian	
regimes	before	offering	 this	generous	support,	
both	 financially	 and	 vocally.	 Is	 the	 EU	 doing	
enough	 now	 for	 those	 where	 the	 transition	
process	 has	 slowed,	 or	 faltered,	 or	 where	
authoritarian	rule	has	remained	or	become	even	
more	entrenched?
In	 the	 1980s	 the	 EU	 governments	 –	 both	
individually	 and	 collectively	 -	 lagged	 behind	
US	 support	 in	 terms	 of	 democratic	 assistance	
to	non-governmental	organisations	 in	countries	
where	 democracy	was	 either	 absent	 or	 in	 its	
early	stages	of	development.	Unfortunately,	this	
democracy	assistance	gap	on	 the	part	 of	 the	
EU	 persists	 today.	 On	 the	 EU’s	 doorstep,	 for	
instance	in	Georgia	and	Ukraine,	US	support	to	
civil	society	continues	to	outstrip	the	EU’s	support	
–	not	only	 in	 terms	of	political	 support,	but	 in	
terms	of	financial	support	 to	non-governmental	
organisations.
While	 European	 Commission	 support	 to	
Ukraine,	 under	 the	 Neighbourhood	 Policy	
Governance	 Facility,	 has	 been	 increased	 to	
€	 22	 million	 for	 2007-10,	 in	 recognition	 of	
its	 democratic	 reforms,	 similar	 increases	 have	
gone	 to	countries	 such	as	Morocco	under	 the	
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amounted	 to	 €	 826m	 and	 US	 assistance	
€	1.2bn.	Of	those	sums,	€	134m	of	EU	support	
went	to	democracy	assistance;	€	370m	of	US	







Fragile	 democracies	 need	 support.	 At	 a	
time	 when,	 in	 Russia	 and	 throughout	 Central	
Asia,	 civil	 society	 is	 threatened	 by	 restrictive	
legislation,	and	 international	 support,	 from	 for	
instance	George	Soros’s	Open	Society	Institute,	
meets	 hostility	 from	 the	 authorities,	 the	 EU	 is	
well	placed	to	work	-	very	often	through	its	new	
members	 that	 have	 emerged	 from	 the	 former	
communist	bloc	-	to	promote	human	rights	and	
freedom	 of	 association	 in	 regimes	 where	 an	
opening	can	be	detected.
Kazakhstan’s	 President	 Nursultan	 Nazarbaev	
justified	the	introduction	of	severe	restrictions	on	
civil	 society	 in	 2005	 following	 the	 Rose	 and	
Orange	 revolutions	 in	 Georgia	 and	 Ukraine	
respectively	as	a	response	to	“the	dangers	that	
arose	 in	 neighbouring	 countries	when	 foreign	







1 Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane?	
By	Richard	Youngs,	Centre	for	European	Studies	Working	
Document	No.	292/May	2008
Enlargement is no longer 
a powerful incentive for 
democratic reforms




the	 second	half	 of	 the	 next	 decade,	 not	 least	
while	the	EU	seeks	to	ratify	and	then	implement	
the	 Lisbon	 Treaty.	 Without	 the	 incentive	 of	
enlargement,	 the	 EU	 needs	 to	 combine	 a	
values-based	 approach	 with	 other	 realistic	
incentives	 to	 stimulate	 good	 governance	 and	
democratisation.	In	the	case	of	Turkey,	increased	
democracy	 and	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	 has	
been	 met	 by	 attempts	 by	 EU	 governments,	
notably	 France,	 Germany	 and	 Austria,	 to	
remove	 any	 prospect	 of	 EU	 membership	 for	
Turkey	-	instead	of	engagement	with	a	strategic	
ally	that	has	embraced	democracy.
An	 important	 test	 facing	 the	 EU	 now	 will	 be	
the	credibility	and	effectiveness	of	the	reformed	
European	 Instrument	 (formerly	 Initiative)	 for	
Democracy	 and	 Human	 Rights	 (EIDHR).	 The	
earlier	 initiative,	designed	 to	be	more	 flexible	
than	other	EU	funding,	for	instance	not	requiring	
the	approval	of	projects	by	host	governments,	




Important	 reforms	 have	 been	 introduced,	
enabling	EIDHR	 funding	 to	go	 to	unregistered	
groups,	 and	 allowing	 some,	 but	 limited	 re-
granting,	 but	 research	 indicates	 that	 the	
reforms	 in	 the	 financial	 regulations	 were	 not	
accompanied	 by	 changes	 in	 staff	 rules	 that	
govern	 the	 decision-making	 of	 European	
Commission	officials,	for	whom	the	competing	
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a	 statement	 that	 it	 “considers	 it	 useful	 to	
establish	a	 special	 European	 fund	 to	 support,	
in	 an	 efficient	 and	 flexible	 manner,	 initiatives	
promoting	 parliamentary	 democracy	 in	
neighbouring	countries”.	




an	 operational	 facility	 at	 arm’s	 length	 from	
the	 institutions	 of	 the	 EU,	 capable	 of	 timely	
responses	 to	 demands	where	 and	when	 they	
are	 most	 needed”,	 and	 “should	 provide	 a	
flexible	funding	instrument	to	support	democratic	
reform	 processes	 and	 programmes,	 capable	
of	operating	at	a	greater	 level	of	 suppleness,	
responsiveness	and	risk”2.		
The	 European	 Foundation	 for	 Democracy	
through	 Partnership	 was	 launched	 in	 Brussels	
on	15	April	2008	with	 the	 support	of	 former	
Czech	 President	 Václav	 Havel	 and	 European	
Commission	President	José	Manuel	Barroso.	The	
new	foundation	 includes	Board	members	 from	
Finland,	 the	 Netherlands,	 France,	 Germany,	
Poland,	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 Slovakia,	 and	
Portugal,	 combining	 old	 and	 new,	 and	 large	
and	small,	eastern	and	southern	EU	members.	
At	the	launch,	Barroso	said	he	was	“delighted	
that	 [the	 new	 foundation]	 will	 be	 reinforcing	
Europe’s	 visibility	 still	 more	 in	 our	 converging	
activities	to	promote	democracy.”
However,	 the	 European	 Commission	 is	 not	
committing	 funding	 to	 the	 new	 foundation,	
and	 the	 continued	 excuse	 for	 the	 EU	 placing	
democracy	 a	 low	 second-place	 behind	
development	 and	 select	 geo-political	 priorities	
was	evident	in	the	same	speech,	when	Barroso	
continued:	“However,	[political	pluralism,	social	
justice	and	 respect	 for	 human	dignity]	will	 be	
2	 A European Foundation for Democracy through 
Partnership,	Netherlands	Institute	for	Multiparty	Democracy,	
March	2006
achieved	 only	 if	we	 first	 succeed	 in	 reducing	
poverty	 and	 injustice.”	 Few	 would	 deny	 the	
importance	 of	 tackling	 poverty	 and	 injustice,	











The key tests facing the 
new European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human 
Rights
Unlike	in	the	US,	“democracy	assistance”	does	
not	 feature	 in	 EU	 discourse,	 and	 no	 concept	
for	a	democratisation	strategy	is	on	the	agenda	
of	 the	 European	 Commission.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	 the	 “promotion	 of	 human	 rights	 and	
democracy”	 has	 become	 a	 well-established	
component	of	EU	external	relations	policy,	with	
multiple	 references	 to	 it	 at	 various	 institutional	





(only)	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 thematic	 programme	
focusing	 on	 democracy	 and	 human	 rights,	 a	
separate	 facility	without	a	 specific	 legal	basis	
that	would	 replace	 the	 European	 Initiative	 for	
Democracy	and	Human	Rights.	
Besides	 this	 thematic	 programme,	 all	
geographical	 instruments	 were	 expected	 to	
be	 “comprehensive	 in	 order	 to	 incorporate	
all	 relevant	 policy	 objectives	 and	 ensure	
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government	 could	 be	 established,	 support	
for	 civil	 society	 and	 non–state	 actors	 would	
have	 fallen	 under	 the	 label	 of	 development	




and	 human	 rights	 instrument	 proved	 to	 be	 a	
challenge.	In	this	debate,	a	crucial	factor	was	the	
strong	partnership	between	civil	society	actors	
and	 the	 democracy	 caucus	 in	 the	 European	
Parliament.	With	the	involvement	of	several	EU	
member	states,	the	idea	reached	a	critical	mass	







One	 of	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 EU	
external	assistance	financial	instruments	was	to	
introduce	more	flexibility.	However,	it	has	to	be	
understood	 that	 any	 change	 takes	 place	 in	 a	
given	 framework.	EU	assistance	will	probably	
always	display	a	certain	degree	of	 rigidity	 in	




and	 Implementing	 Rules	 were	 amended	 with	
effect	 from	1	May	2007.	 The	main	 changes	
introduced	by	the	reforms	are:	







and	 fund	 recipients)	 was	 combined	 with	 an	
emphasis	on	the	safety	of	the	beneficiaries.	
Rules first, quality second
Although	several	steps	forward	were	taken	and	
some	obstacles	to	flexible	project	management	
were	 removed,	 at	 least	 two	 reservations	 can	











culture	 is	 underway,	 and	 only	 effective	
monitoring	 and	 evaluation	 of	 the	 instrument	
will	 provide	 evidence	 for	 the	 need	 for	 further	
institutional	reform.	
Furthermore,	 the	 provisions	 on	 the	 financial	
liability	 of	 officials	 only	 compound	 this	
problem.	Although	the	Financial	Regulation	and	
Implementing	Rules	specifically	allow	for	more	
flexibility	 on	 the	 side	 of	 officials,	 the	 problem	
was	and	remains	the	Commission’s	management	
culture,	 where	 too	 much	 pressure	 and	 the	
burden	of	responsibility	are	placed	on	the	desk	
officers.	 Second,	 in	 some	 cases	 (re-granting,	
financial	 guarantees),	 the	 results	 achieved	 by	
pressure	from	civil	society	organisations	during	
the	negotiations	on	the	amendments	are	rather	
modest	 (for	 example,	 from	 any	 one	 grant	 the	
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but	 with	 policy	 and	 political	 reach.	 These	
features	 were	 retained	 and	 enhanced	 within	




manage,	 fund	 and	 co-ordinate	 projects	 in	 a	
fast,	flexible	and	responsive	way	–	in	particular,	
the	 centralised	 calls	 for	 proposals	 with	 long	




impact,	 supporting	 largely	 ad-hoc	 initiatives,	
not	applying	 resources	strategically,	and	often	
losing	momentum	 for	 supporting	 locally	driven	
processes	of	change.	
The	new	Instrument	naturally	aims	at	overcoming	









Targeting more countries, 
but resources spread 
more thinly
The	 number	 of	 countries	 eligible	 for	 EIDHR	
funding	 is	 constantly	growing	and,	according	
to	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	 thematic	
approach	has	become	a	necessity	for	effective	
implementation	 and	 for	 delivery	 of	 results.	 A	
trend	 towards	 further	 integration	 of	 themes	
into	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 campaigns	 in	 order	
to	 streamline	 and	 reduce	 fragmentation	 is	
evident.	
Some	provisions	aiming	at	making	 the	 system	
faster	 and	 more	 flexible	 were	 also	 adopted;	
for	 example,	 the	 Commission	 now	 has	 the	
possibility	 to	 adopt	 Special	 and	 Ad	 hoc	
measures	in	case	of	urgent	need	(without	calls	
for	 proposals,	 targeting	 specifically	 human	




the	 applicable	 national	 law”	 and	 “groups	 of	
natural	persons	without	a	legal	personality	and	
civil	society	organisations”.	
???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????? ??????????? ??????????? ??????????? ??????????? ???????????
???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???????????
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A Democracy Foundation 
at arm's length
As	 part	 of	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 flexibility	 of	 the	
new	 Instrument,	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	
powers	and	 resources	emerged	 in	connection	
with	 the	proposal	 to	establish	an	 independent	
foundation	 managing	 at	 least	 a	 part	 of	 the	
EIDHR	 budget.	 The	 idea	 of	 the	 European	
Foundation	for	Democracy	 through	Partnership	
(EFDP)	 was	 tabled,	 with	 support	 from	 the	
European	 Parliament	 democracy	 caucus,	 but	
it	was	ultimately	decided	that	no	direct	EIDHR	
funding	would	be	allocated	to	the	foundation.	
Other	 questions	 or	 key	 criticisms	 remain	 to	
be	 resolved:	 for	 example,	 how	 can	 the	 intra-	
and	 inter-EU	 institutional	 co-operation	 be	
strengthened,	how	can	co-operation	with	other	
donors	be	made	more	effective?	
The	 long	 evaluation	 process	 pertaining	 to	
projects	 tabled	 within	 the	 centralised	 funding	
schemes	(macro-projects)	will	most	probably	stay	





missions	 only	 to	 the	 countries	 that	 invite	 them	
to	do	so,	clearly	contradicting	 the	 idea	of	 the	
instrument	 that	actions	covered	do	not	 require	
the	host	government's	consent.
To	 conclude,	 the	 goal	 of	 the	 reform	 was	 to	
tackle	 some	 of	 the	 problems	 and	 points	 of	
criticism	connected	to	EU	democracy	assistance	
implemented	 through	 civil	 society.	 The	 real	





in-making,	 and	 scrutiny	 and	 monitoring	 in	
the	 coming	 years	 is	 essential	 to	 ensure	 that	
the	 Instrument’s	 mid-term	 evaluation,	 which	 is	






without	 host	 government	 consent,	 will	 be	 an	
important	pointer	to	judge	the	trajectory	of	EU	
democracy	assistance	policies.	
External Action Service 
must have ears and eyes 
in-country
In	an	effort	to	boost	flexibility,	the	Commission	
intends	 instead	 to	 continue	 to	 transfer	
competences	 to	 the	 European	 Commission	
Delegations	in	third	countries.	However,	further	
delegation	of	the	management	of	EIDHR	funding	
to	 EC	 Delegations	 without	 reinforcing	 their	
capacities	could	be	counterproductive,	bringing	
additional	 administrative	 burdens	 to	 the	 staff	
and,	in	fact,	diminishing	their	effectiveness.	
Once	 the	 Lisbon	 Treaty	 is	 ratified,	 the	 EU	
Special	Representative	for	Foreign	and	Security	
Policy	will	be	asked	 to	 formulate	 the	basis	on	
which	the	new	EU	External	Action	Service	will	
be	established	and	will	operate.	It	is	clear	that	
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